How do interest groups choose across different venues of lobbying to influence policy? Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? We theorize lobbying as an organized interests' effort to form and enforce a contract with policy-makers, politicians or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational structures of interest groups substantially affect their choice of lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy-makers and punish them when they fail. We demonstrate that whether structures are centralized or decentralized accounts for a good part of the variations in their venue choices. Different types of electoral systems, we further argue, affect the effectiveness of various instruments of monitoring and punishment (votes, political funds, and candidate endorsement) and hence interest groups' choice to lobby politicians or bureaucrats. We test these arguments with the case of a major democracy which recently went through an electoral reform without major partisan change, Japan. We use a unique longitudinal survey data on lobbying which spans two decades (1980, 1994, 2003), covers around 250 organized interest groups in various sectors and issue areas. The results lend strong support to our organizational structure argument and the effect of electoral reform on interest groups' choice of lobbying tactics.
INTRODUCTION

How do interest groups choose across different venues of lobbying to influence policy?
Why do some interest groups lobby politicians and others lobby bureaucrats? These questions lie at the heart of much of the classic literature in political economy, ranging from Madison and the Federalist Papers and Dahl's seminal study of pluralism in New Haven (Dahl 1963 ) through studies of corporatism (e.g., Schmitter and Lembruch 1979) to the collective choice literature (e.g. Olson 1965 ). Yet the existing literature on lobbying tends to ask to what extent interest groups influence policy rather than a question of how they attempt to influence it. In particular, the question of venue selection, i.e., how interest groups choose across multiple venues of lobbying, has not been explored extensively to date.
In contrast to the existing approaches that theorize interest groups' goals of lobbying as changing legislators' preferences or their policy-making resources (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996, Walker 1991; Hall and Deardorff 2006) , we theorize lobbying as an organized interests' effort to monitor and enforce a contract with policy-makers, politicians or bureaucrats. We argue that organizational structures of interest groups, in particular, whether organizational structures are centralized or decentralized, substantially affect their choice of lobbying strategies because they are associated with different ability to monitor and enforce contracts with policy-makers and punish them when they fail. We further demonstrate that the effect of centralized vs. decentralized structure on venue choices is conditional on the types of electoral system: majoritiarian, semi-proportional (single-non-transferrable-vote: SNTV), or proportional representation systems. Under a highly personalistic electoral system like SNTV, decentralized groups are more likely to go to a political route as they are better able to monitor, enforce, and punish politicians than centralized groups. Under a party-centered electoral systems, such as a P. 3
closed-list proportional representation system, centralized groups are more likely to go to a political route as they are better able to enforce and punish politicians via political parties.
We test this argument with a major democracy and economy that underwent an electoral reform, Japan. Japan provides a quasi-experimental opportunity to test how interest group organizations and electoral institutions interact to shape lobbying strategies for two reasons.
First, it is quasi-experimental because the electoral reform occurred without a major partisan change (Horiuchi and Saito 2003) . Second, post-War Japan provides a laboratory of electoral systems because it has employed SNTV (pre-1994) and majoritarian combined with proportional representation systems (post-1994) . We use a unique longitudinal elite survey data set of a large sample of interest group leaders at three data points spanning a quarter of century. We demonstrate that interest groups adapt their lobbying strategies and organizations to the change in electoral institutions in which they are embedded. Our argument proceeds in two steps.
First, we theorize interest groups' lobbying venue choices and intensity as an effort to enforce and monitor a contract with politicians and hypothesize how various organizational structures of interest groups are linked with their potential ability to make politicians commit to this contract. When the interest groups' organizational structures allow more effective monitoring and punishment of politicians who fail to commit (i.e., not to reelect or withdraw financial contribution), they are more likely to go to a political route. When their organizational structures do not allow effective monitoring and punishment of politicians who shirk or renege, they are more likely to go to a bureaucratic route to influence an earlier formulation or implementation stage of policy-making.
Second, organized interests use various instruments to punish politicians who shirk or renege on the contracts: votes, candidate endorsement, and campaign contributions are the major Who Lobbies Whom? P. 4
examples. We construct typologies of these punishment mechanisms into decentralized and centralized instruments and discuss how the effectiveness of various instruments changed due to the 1994 electoral reform. We expect that the electoral reform from a Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system with multi-member districts to a mixed SMD/PR system decreases the effectiveness of decentralized punishment mechanism (voting in a district or candidate endorsement) while increases the effectiveness of centralized punishment mechanism (voting for a party). Thus, the reform is expected to diminish the difference between decentralized and centralized groups' lobbying strategies. We find, indeed, our organizational structure argument explains variations across interest groups as well as changes after the electoral reform after controlling for their organizational resources and for sectoral issue areas.
THEORIES OF LOBBYING VENUE CHOICES
Why do some interest groups lobby politicians, while others lobby bureaucrats? The question is at the heart of why interest groups lobby. Two school of thoughts have emerged in the literature on the United States: one that theorizes the interest groups' goals of lobbying as changing or enhancing policy-makers' preferences ("preference-centered approach") and another that theorizes lobbying as a function of organizational resources of interest groups or legislators ("resource-centered approach").
Preference-Centered Approach: Exchange and Persuasion
The preference-centered approach views organized interests' lobbying as an effort to change or align their preferences with legislators to achieve policy goals. In this approach, the two mediums that organized interests use to shape legislators' preferences are money and 40% with politician. 51% of leaders say it is most effective to contact bureaucrats to express their opinions and to protect their interests while 36% says it is effective to contact politicians.
With its focus on the role of money in changing legislators' preferences, the exchange theories do not help us understand why interest groups lobby bureaucrats at all.
Another argument, which is referred to as persuasion theories, theorizes information transmission from organized interests to policy-makers as a mechanism to enhance-rather than to change-policy-makers' preferences (Hansen 1991; Wright 1996; Austen-Smith 1993 , 1994 .
This approach views information asymmetry between legislators and organized interests as a key determinant of lobbying and explains several anomalies found in the exchange theories, such as why interest groups lobby allies more than swing legislators and why interest groups lobby bureaucrats. Moreover, unlike the exchange theories in which "the money, not information or arguments of the lobbyist, is the variable doing the behavioral work" (Hall and Deardorff 2006:71) , the persuasion theories model the lobbying process more directly as information transmission via personal contacts and deliberations (Wright 1990) .
Its weakness, however, is two-fold. First, due to the difficulty in systematically studying the process of private information transmission, empirical tests of these theories have lagged far behind the theories (exceptions are Furlong 1998; Golden 1998; Yackee and Yackee 2006) .
Second, the persuasion theories assume that legislators face uncertainty about constituents' positions on a given policy and this uncertainty makes them rely on information provided by organized interests. This logic, however, does not account for why interest groups often lobby bureaucrats who do not face this need to learn constituents' positions. says legislators assist their groups because they agrees with the group's goal or policy, 17% says because they have a long-term trustworthy relationship with a group, 13% says it is because they provide organized votes during elections. Only less than 10% says because the group provides information. What, then, is to be "persuaded"?
Resource-Centered Approach
Contrary to the preference-centered views discussed above, Hall and Deardorff (2006) propose a novel, resource-centered argument of lobbying. Direct lobbying, they argue, is a gift from organized interests to like-minded legislators in forms of information and subsidy to assist resource-scarce legislators to work at achieving a policy. The lobbying-as-subsidy theory solves many anomalies found in light of exchange and persuasion theories: why interest groups lobby allies more than swing legislators and why legislators often initiate contacts with organized interests. Yackee and Yackee (2006) These approaches also remain silent about varying levels of lobbying, i.e., why some interest groups contact policy-makers very often while others contact a few times.
LOBBYING AS CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
We model interest group's lobbying venue choices and intensity as a function of their contract enforceability with policy-makers. Our contractual approach theorizes interest groups' goal of lobbying as an effort to enforce a contract with legislators who are already sympathetic to their preferred policies. Our approach accounts for major puzzles about interest group lobbying in general and in Japan in particular: why do interest groups predominantly lobby legislators who are already sympathetic to their policy; why do they lobby legislators with a long-standing relationship; and why do some groups lobby politicians while others lobby bureaucrats?
Policy-Making Environment: Electoral Institutions and Legislative Organizations
To account for the major puzzles described above, we need to understand incentives of both supply (legislators) and demand-side (organized interests) of lobbying. There are two institutional characteristics that shape legislators' incentives to form, renege on, or shirk the contract with organized interests in Japan: electoral institutions and legislative organization (i.e., a committee system). In Japan, under the SNTV system in which district magnitude generally ranged from one to five, same-party candidates of the largest ruling party, the Liberal Democrats, competed for a seat. The SNTV system encourages individual legislators to cultivate "personal votes" rather than to collectively pursue a coherent party label (Cox and Thies 1998; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1994 and many others) . Moreover, since votes that individual legislators win in a district are not transferable to other same-party candidates, individual legislators have incentives to specialize either geographically (Hirano 2006; Tatebayashi 2004) or sectorally (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1994; McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995) to differentiate themselves from other same-party candidates. Thus, under an SNTV system, legislators' incentives were to target narrow constituents as opposed to building a majoritarian coalition with broader and more diverse constituents ("specialization").
Legislative organizations also mirror legislator's personal vote incentives shaped by electoral institutions. The LDP's policy-making organization under an SNTV system was decentralized and specialized. The party decided policies through an extensive committee system (Policy Affairs Research Council; PARC) each of which oversaw corresponding cabinet ministries and bureaucratic agencies. 3 The decentralized committee system also gave policymaking power to party backbenchers who needed to credit-claim to special interests to mobilize votes and campaign contribution. interests have difficulty identifying who opposes vs. who supports a policy at the PARC meetings or any contribution made during the meetings. 6 This is one of the consequences of the one-party dominant, policy-making environment before 1994 in which major policy decisions were made within the ruling party rather than in the Diet. This means that centralized groups without local organizations have difficulty monitoring and acquiring information about the extent to which politicians commit and contribute to realizing their preferred policy. As a result, contract enforcement, monitoring and punishment mechanisms have to be decentralized and localized so that interest groups can hold individual politicians accountable to their promises.
Decentralized Lobbying as Contract Enforcement under SNTV
Under the SNTV system described above, politicians and organized interests exchanged promises during the election campaigns but these contracts were susceptible to legislators' reneging and shirking. Organized interests used various instruments to reduce wasting their lobbying efforts, such as ex ante "contracts" and ex post punishment and rewards.
Anecdotes suggest that legislators and special interests form such ex-ante "contracts" in Japan. Aurelia George Mulgan (2006:61) describes what a politician who specialized in the agricultural sector had to go through to get the endorsement of a major agricultural group:
For Matsuoka to receive electoral support from the prefectural nouseiren, he had to demonstrate sympathy for, and understanding of, the organisation's agricultural policy campaigns (nousei undou) and to make a public promise of adherence to a position that would reflect the intentions of Nokyo along with farmers in politics. In exchange for recommendation and authorisation (kounin mo suishin mo), he would have to sign a policy agreement with the organisation and become a staunch friend (meiyuu) of the league.
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Ex-post monitoring and rewards for loyalty also exist. Woodall (1996) documents that the large construction firms graded the politicians' contributions to delivering their preferred policy and rewarded those with good grades with larger biannual campaign contribution (Woodall 1996: 114) .
Other anecdotes abound suggesting that politicians' shirking may well be punished by There was only one (LDP) lower-house representative from Akita prefecture who attended our big meeting to discuss the issue of rice price last year. It showed the serious lack of interests of Akita (LDP) representatives in helping farmers out. We were very frustrated. Except for one, all of our 19 committee members for the candidate endorsement were conservatives (i.e., the LDP supporters). But we decided to endorse Mr. Nakagawa (of the JCP) who has worked hard for us …This was very effective-after the election, the LDP politicians treat us much better when we lobby them. Their attitudes completely changed." (Interview Documented in Tachibana, The above examples illustrate the importance of our contractual approach. Even special interest politicians-those who are already sympathetic to a given organized interests-can renege on the contract with interest groups or shirk on the effort to realize a policy. Incentives to renege or shirk can be political (e.g., the party orders them to do otherwise or there are conflicts of interest in a district, see fn.6) or efficiency-driven (e.g., allocate their resources to mobilize P. 13 swing voters, while keeping the core constituents' votes), but either way, such incentives may be prevalent as seen in the above episode.
Organized interests use various ways to reduce the risk of such political market failure. activities and responsiveness to the local interests may be more costly to acquire and coordinate for centralized interest groups without local organizations than decentralized interest groups with both headquarters in Tokyo and local organizations in districts. This is due to the lack of transparency at the PARC meeting, as discussed previously, and local organizations' geographic proximity to local representatives.
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The second way to deal with the commitment failure is to effectively punish politicians who renege or shirk. 10 The organizational structures of interest groups affect their effectiveness to punish in two ways. First, decentralized interest groups can punish individual politicians 8 The most drastic solution to this contractual problem is to send their own members to the Diet (Gehlbach and Sonin 2004). The head of Agricultural Cooperative in Miyazaki prefecture said: "We need to send our own people to the Diet…The LDP's self-claimed 'agricultural politicians (nousei-ha)' pretend like they support farmers, but when necessary, they defect us by choosing to abide by the party order. We need someone-the true supporters of farmers-who will break away from the party to support farmers when they have to. " (Tachibana, p.355) .
P. 14 running in electoral systems with local districts (SNTV or SMD) by withdrawing political support without coordinating their actions across districts. For instance, the anecdote of Akita prefecture demonstrates that while the national-level Agricultural Cooperative was a supporter of the LDP, the local-level offices had autonomy to make their own political decisions, e.g., endorsing a candidate from a different party. The local-level offices, not the national-level office,
were the ones that were vote mobilizing organs during the election campaigns.
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On the other hand, interest groups with centralized structure face several difficulties in monitoring and punishing politicians who did not deliver the promised policy benefits, particularly under a highly personalistic system like SNTV system. Organized interests with a centralized structure, such as the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren; big business's peak association) have used political donations as a means to reward or punish the political parties. They lack, however, the decentralized mechanism to punish individual politicians running from majoritarian districts who renege or shirk. For instance, after the major defections by some LDP politicians to oppose the 2005 postal reform legislation, Keidanren's president Okuda announced that "Overall, Keidanren supports the LDP, but how our member company deals with individual district cases is up to them." In other words, Keidanren can collectively act at the center on whether to grant political donations to political parties, yet they could not coordinate their actions across local districts to mobilize or withdraw political support.
It is thus likely that interest groups that have local organizations are more likely to lobby politicians because they are in a better position to monitor and punish politicians in his or her 11 Indeed, Tachibana (1984) suggests that the agricultural cooperative is decentralized fiscally and politically despite its formal rule that "all the members have to abide by the headquarter's (chuou-kai) orders" 11 (p. 355).
P. 15 district. 12 Centrally-organized groups without local organizations are more likely to go to the national bureaucracy to influence different stages of policy-making such as drafting and implementation of policies that were passed.
H1: Decentralized interest groups are more likely to lobby politicians than centralized interest groups without local organizations under the SNTV system before 1994.
The Electoral Reform: SMD/PR System
The electoral reform of 1994 to the SMD/PR system changed the policy-making environment in two ways: (i) broadening and diversifying the scope of constituents which legislators need to target and (ii) centralizing policy-making power to party leaders (see Table 1 ).
The new SMD/PR system allocates 300 seats for SMD and 180 seats for a closed-list PR system.
Voters cast two votes, one for a candidate from SMD district and another for a party and these votes are fungible.
First, under the SMD, a single representative must win and represent the whole district with a diverse constituency (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004: 10-12) . This weakens legislators' incentives to pursue the personal vote and instead strengthens their incentives to build a broader, majoritarian coalition with diffused and organized interests. Second, since only one candidate from different parties compete for a seat, the reform strengthens legislators' incentives to pursue party label. The SMD also centralizes the power structure within parties because legislators depend on party nominations to win seats (Asano 2006) . Third, under the closed-list PR, the party chooses the candidates and their ranking on the list. Thus, parties have greater control over its individual legislators than they were under SNTV (Shugart 2001) . Voters also must cast a 12 Another reason for why interest groups with local organizations are more likely to lobby politicians is that the proximity makes it easier to access politicians. The "access" argument remains insufficient, however, because the majority of lower-house representatives spend the half of their time in Tokyo and the other half in their own districts and the majority of organized interests surveyed have headquarters or local brunches in Tokyo.
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vote for a party under PR system which weakens the tie between individual legislators and electorates.
Legislative organizations adapt to legislators' new incentives shaped by the electoral reform (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss 2006) . After the electoral reform bill was passed, the LDP stopped limiting its representatives' PARC affiliations to maximum of four committees and allowed any to join as many committees as they wished. The LDP recognized that its representatives need to be more policy generalists to win Single-member districts (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004: 17-20) . The policy-making power has also shifted from individual politicians to party leaders and the cabinet ("centralization") (Muramatsu 2006) . Table 1 summarizes our expectations of how policy-making environment shapes lobbying strategies before and after the electoral reform.
Interest groups should adapt their lobbying strategies to legislators' new incentives. First, the centralization of policy-making means that the effectiveness of the decentralized monitoring and punishment mechanism (i.e., withdrawing votes or candidate endorsement in a district)
should decrease under the SMD/PR system. The decentralized punishment is less effective for the regional block PR portion as it encompasses much diverse sectors and geography than the previous SNTV districts. The SMD portion also forces representatives to build broader majoritarian coalitions in constituencies than under SNTV (Rogowski and Kayser 2002; McGillivray 1997; 2004) . 13 This means that decentralized interest groups will continue to lobby SMD representatives via local organizations, although this incentive might be weaker than under SNTV as they face more difficulty monitoring and enforcing a contract with legislators in districts. Instead, decentralized groups will begin lobbying legislators also through the central channel (i.e., headquarters) to influence the party decisions. On the other hand, we would expect that the centralized interest groups lobby politicians more than the previous two surveys. This is because they can use the centralized punishment mechanisms, i.e., using PR votes to political parties under the new electoral system. Thus Japan's mixed electoral system provides incentives for interest groups to centralize their lobbying strategies. These expected changes lead us to hypothesize:
H2: Interest groups that are centralized without local organizations will be more likely to lobby politicians after the reform than the previous SNTV period. Decentralized groups will be more likely to shift allocation of lobbying efforts from local organizations to the central office. Thus differences between centralized and decentralized interest groups will diminish after electoral reform.
Another major institutional reform that may increase the effectiveness of the centralized groups' ability to punish individual politicians may diminish and they might channel campaign contribution via the central office after the reform.
14 H3: After campaign finance reforms, centralized groups will be more likely to lobby politicians than they were before the reform.
The above hypotheses are summarized in Table 2 of the Appendix.
DATA AND METHOD
The three interest group surveys conducted by the Muramatsu-Kume group in 1980 , 1994 provide data on two to three hundred interest group organizations for each survey that ranges from peak associations of various industries to non-governmental organizations and religious groups. The surveys were conducted by a professional survey research firm in Japan on a sample of interest group leaders. The sampling procedure is described in detail in the appendix.
We use each interest group organization as a unit of analysis and analyze their choice of lobbying venues and intensity for each of the three surveys. 15 The models estimated have the following structure:
Our first data point (1980) 
The Dependent Variable: Relative vs. Absolute Choice of Venues
While existing studies tend to theorize multiple venues to be mutually exclusive, i.e., interest groups choose one venue or the other, in reality, the choice of venue is rather relative.
The majority of interest groups lobby both politicians and bureaucracy but strategically allocate their lobbying resources-such as time and human capital-to these venues to maximize their chances of achieving policy goals. In order to capture the interest groups decision, we create an index of relative allocation of interest groups' resources for lobbying politicians vs. bureaucrats.
We do so by using following questions: 16 A potential issue with using this questionnaire is that they limit the universe of "bureaucrats and politicians" to those who hold important positions in a government. The benefit of using this question, on the other hand, is that it captures groups' contacts with politicians and bureaucrats that actually matter for policy-making and implementation. Moreover, Vice Minister and Parliamentary Ministerial positions are usually given to junior to mid-career politicians (mean numbers of terms served are three). Another advantage of using this questionnaire is its specificity regarding which government positions interest groups contact. While a questionnaire such as "how often do you contact politicians (or bureaucrats)" (this question does not exist in this survey) may seem better because it captures interest groups contact with a broader spectrum of politicians and bureaucrats, who constitutes
We categorize these ten positions into two groups, one with positions held by politicians (1 to 5) and by bureaucrats (6 to 10). 17 We transform this five-scale response so that the higher the value, the more frequent an interest group contacts with a given position (4.Very Frequent, 3.Frequent, 2.Not so often, 1.Rare, 0. Not at all). We aggregate this data on the frequency of contacts by interest groups with politicians (variable named "pol_contact") and bureaucrats ("bu_contact") and calculate the total frequency of contacts for each interest group per survey ( "total contact").
Then we calculate the percentage of the total contacts with politicians ("perc_pol_contact"). The Our main independent variable is whether an interest group has local organizations that could potentially make independent decisions about candidate endorsement, vote switching, or campaign contribution to legislators. We proxy the centralized vs. decentralized organizational structure with interest groups' response to a questionnaire on whether interest group has local organizations or not (variable named "Local org"). While the majority of interest groups that have local organizations in these surveys have headquarters in Tokyo, we differentiate groups politicians or bureaucrats is often ambiguous and may suffer from the lack of comparability across interest groups' responses.
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that have headquarters in Tokyo and groups that have headquarters outside of Tokyo vicinity to parse out Walker's (1991) access argument from our organizational structure argument.
"No_tokyo_hq" takes a value of one if a group has a headquarter outside of Tokyo vicinity and zero otherwise.
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Alternative Hypotheses and Controls:
Organizational Resources:
The first alternative hypothesis we test is that the interest groups' organizational resource might better account for lobbying patterns (Olson 1965; de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo 2002) .
In particular, groups that provide organized votes or campaign contribution might prefer to go through a political route while weaker interests might prefer to go through an administrative route. We include three variables a size of membership (logged "ln_membership") to see whether this is the case. 19 We also expect that the number of special interest politicians who represent a given sectoral interests ("policy tribes") should have strong, positive effects on the interest group's decision to lobby politicians. The data on special interest politicians is matched with eight different types of sectoral interests, such as agriculture, welfare, industry and economy, defense, and labor. 20 Alternatively, groups may either send current members to a parliament or to appoint legislators on their executive board to enhance their connections with politicians.
18 These no_tokyo_hq organizations tend to be religious or civil society groups. 19 We dealt with missing values for the membership variable as follows. If a given group's membership information is available for the second or third waves of survey, we use its response to a questionnaire on its membership during the past twenty years in ten-year interval. 
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"Current MPs" takes a value of one when a group's member is a member of parliament and zero otherwise.
We also include two variables that measure the strength of interest groups' connections with bureaucrats. "Advisory Council (Shingikai)" takes a value of one when a group has a membership at advisory councils at ministries where potential legislations are discussed with bureaucrats and experts. "Retirement position" takes a value of one when a group offers a retirement position for a government officials (Amakudari), and zero otherwise. Finally, a long time horizon and repeated interaction among actors makes monitoring and enforcement of contracts with politicians easier (Axelrod 1984; Snyder 1992; Weingast, Milgrom, and Grief 1994) . Thus, the age of interest group as of survey date is calculated by the year of survey minus the year of organization's establishment ("Group Age").
Issue Areas and Sectors:
The second alternative hypothesis is that the sectoral or issue characteristics affect interest groups' lobbying strategies (Magee et al.1978; Hiscox 2001; Alt et al.1999 ). We include a dummy variable for interest groups in agriculture ("agriculture"), industry ("industry"), and labor ("labor") to control for the sectoral effects. Sectoral dummies also allow us to identify any agency slack that exists between a particular Ministry and legislators (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) . We expect that agricultural interests will consistently select politicians more than bureaucrats to lobby. Conversely, industry organizations with its diversity and dispersion across different electoral districts will choose to lobby bureaucrats more, as will labor since it has few close connections to the conservative LDP. We also include a dummy variable ("sm_industry") for organizations dominated by small and medium-size firms as small-medium size firms are more likely to be geographically concentrated in districts and they have been a strong supporter of the LDP.
The sectoral analysis is insufficient when globalization-freer movement of goods, capital, and labor-generates economic winners and losers within a sector (Rogowski 1987; Hiscox 2002; Alt et al. 1999) . We expect that those who stand to benefit from globalization are more likely to go to bureaucrats as they tend to have upper-hand in negotiating with foreign countries (Davis 2003; 2004) , while those who stand to lose are more likely to go to politicians for compensation and protection. To test this, a variable "International" is included which takes a value of one when a group has a foreign office and zero otherwise.
We also control for the nature of contacts between interest groups and bureaucrats/politicians. "Subsidy" takes a value of one and zero otherwise when interest groups receive subsidy from the government. In order to test whether heavily regulated groups are more likely to go to bureaucrats, we create an index of regulation (" 
Estimations
Our first dependent variable is aggregation of six to ten "contact scores" with politicians and bureaucrats. Since a response category for the each of the questionnaires ranges from zero ("not at all") to four ("very often"), the total contact score is an ordered, categorical dependent variable that can theoretically range from zero to 40 (four multiplied by ten). We categorize the data into four levels, not at all (0), some times (1), frequent (2), and very frequent (3) contacts and analyze the data with an ordered logit estimation. Our second dependent variable is the allocation of lobbying efforts to politicians relative to bureaucrats as described previously. This is a continuous percentage variable ranging from zero to one and is transformed as follows
Ln_Y=ln(Y/(1-Y)) to allow OLS estimation ("perc_pol_contact").
RESULTS Table 4 to 7 shows coefficients estimates of variables on the choice of lobbying strategies.
The results lend strong support to our organizational structure argument even after controlling for organizational resources, issue areas, and the nature of contacts. We discuss specific results below. Table 4 shows the results on the frequency of contacts with politicians. The effects of organizational structures of interest groups are significant for their decisions to lobby politicians under the SNTV system. Under the SNTV system, decentralized interest groups are more likely to go to a political route when they lobby than centralized interests, confirming the Hypothesis 1.
Organizational Structures: Centralized vs. Decentralized Groups
The results are robust with relative operationalization of "lobbying politicians" as presented in Table 7 .
Who Lobbies Whom?
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The substantive impact of the effects of the organizational structures on lobbying is quite large. Table 5 presents the simulated effects of groups having local organizations on their frequency of lobbying with legislators. During the second survey (1994), the predicted probability of centralized interest groups not contacting legislators at all (Y=0) is 33% higher than decentralized interest groups. On the other hand, the predicted probability of decentralized interest groups contacting politicians "some times" is 40% to 18% for centralized groups and "frequent" is 12% to 3% for centralized groups. In Table 7 , one unit shift from without local organizations to having local organizations increases the relative allocation of lobbying efforts to politicians around 44 percentage point (e.g., 6% to 50%) in the second survey.
The Effect of Electoral Reform
After the electoral reform (2003), overall intensity of lobbying with politicians has increased. Among 144 groups that were consistently surveyed for the second and the third survey, the average contact scores have increased three points in 16-point scale (3.7 to 6.9). This is consistent with our contractual approach that interest groups are more likely to lobby politicians when enforceability of contract is high under the centralized policy-making system.
We find no systematic evidence that decentralized interest groups are more likely to lobby politicians than centralized interests. This is consistent with our Hypothesis 2 that under the mixed SMD/PR system, the effectiveness of the decentralized punishment mechanism via voting or endorsing a candidate in SM districts declines and the effectiveness of the centralized punishment via campaign contribution or mobilizing/withdrawing PR party votes increases.
Indeed, the effects of decentralized vs. centralized structure diminishes after the electoral reform.
Graph 1 presents the frequency of contacts with politicians before and after the reform for the P. 26 144 groups that were consistently surveyed for the second and third survey. Centralized groups have increased their contact scores substantially by 63%, while decentralized groups moderately increased their contact scores by 18% which confirms H2 and H3.
Who Contacts Bureaucrats? Table 6 presents results on the frequency of interest groups' contacts with bureaucrats using the same co-variates as our analysis on contacts with politicians. Overall, the organizational structures of interest groups have systematic effects on their relative decisions to lobby bureaucrats over politicians, but they do not have systematic effects on their intensity of lobbying with bureaucrats. This is consistent with our expectation that the organizational structures of interest groups should matter mostly to their decisions to lobby politicians because they provide interest groups with monitoring and punishment mechanism when the commitment fails. There is no equivalent punishment mechanism interest groups can use for bureaucrats such as withdrawing campaign contribution or votes. 21 One exception, however, is the age of the group. During the first survey, the older organizations were more likely to go to bureaucrats which is consistent with Muramatsu's argument (Muramatsu, et.al. 1986: 73; Muramatsu and Krauss 1987: 522) that older organizations have more institutionalized relationship with bureaucracy. The effect of Group Age, however, diminishes after 1980.
The Advisory Council membership and degrees to which a given organization is regulated ("regulation index") has significant positive effects on their decisions to lobby bureaucrats as expected. Whether an organized interest offers a retirement position (Amakudari)
21 One possible punishment for bureaucrats is not to grant a retirement position ("Amakudari") for retirees from a particular bureau. One of the authors experienced a personal anecdote illustrating this potential punishment. A thenmid-level bureaucrat in an economic ministry said he had to be very careful not to alienate any of the key interest groups in electronic industry for fear of damaging his chances for a good retirement position which was years ahead. The author asked "Are you really worried about that now?" and the reply was "We all are."
for bureaucrats has no systematic effects for the first two surveys, but has positive effects on groups' decision to lobby bureaucrats during 2003 survey. This is due to the fact that the fewer number of retirement positions became available under Prime Minister Koizumi's reform and this has increased the value of the reward for bureaucrats. These results are particularly interesting in regards to the conventional wisdom on amakudari that sees it as a means by which interest groups hold agencies hostage to favorable treatment in regulation (Schaede 1994 , Amyx 2004 , Grimes 2005 . Our findings indicate that its impact on lobbying decisions of interest groups may be less than thought when such positions were abundant in the 1980's and 1990's.
Other Findings: Organizational Resources
A few alternative hypotheses find expected support. Organized interests that have more political resources-such as the larger membership size and having a member of parliament as their member-are more likely to work through a political route than a bureaucratic route. The longer a given group has been around, the more likely that they contact politicians confirming the importance of the long time-horizon in increasing the enforceability of contract.
The number of policy tribe politicians have no systematic effects on groups' decisions to lobby politicians and have weak, negative effects on their decisions to lobby bureaucrats for the second survey, which is unexpected. A possible explanation for this is that policy tribe politicians were not institutionalized during the 1980 survey, and then developed into a mediator who aligns organized interests with bureaucratic, sectoral interests by the 1994 survey, but has lost its mission after the electoral reform due to the centralization of power to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet (Muramatsu 2005 , Krauss 2007 . 22 In sum, organizational resources do affect P. 28 interest groups' decision to lobby politicians, but the effect is weak and inconsistent across the surveys.
Control Variables
Majority In sum, this paper has identified the effect of major electoral reform in 1994 on the choice of lobbying activities. The new electoral system decreased the effectiveness of the decentralized punishment mechanism while it increased the effectiveness of mobilizing vs.
withdrawing party votes for the centralized groups. The other decentralized punishment mechanism, i.e., withdrawing campaign contributions for individual politicians, has become less effective due to the revision of Regulation on Political Funds in 1994. These institutional interests lobbied either through local organization or policy tribe politicians, but not both. This relationship has changed after the reform-these two variables positively correlate at 0.08.
P. 29
reforms changed the effectiveness of various monitoring and punishment mechanisms interest groups can use and consequently their lobbying behavior.
CONCLUSION
The findings presented in this paper suggest a reconsideration of the preference and resource-centered explanations of lobbying widely used in the literature. We have demonstrated the importance of theorizing lobbying venue choice and intensity as a function of contract enforceability between interest groups and policy-makers. The organizational characteristics of interest groups-i.e., whether an interest group is decentralized or centralized-substantially affect their choice to lobby politicians or bureaucrats because they are associated with varying abilities to monitor and enforce the contracts and punish when they fail to deliver the promises.
Our contractual approach solves some of the major puzzles left in the literature on lobbying.
Organized interests tend to lobby legislators who are sympathetic to their policies and who have a long-term relationship because with repeated interactions and with a long time-horizon, it is easier to enforce contracts with them. The low contract enforceability characterized by decentralized policy-making environment-such as the one under SNTV electoral system-deters intensive lobbying with politicians by organized interests, particularly by groups characterized by centralized structures. These groups lobby bureaucrats more extensively because their organizational structures do not allow them to enforce contracts with legislators or punish them when they fail. On the other hand, in a more party-centered, centralized policy-making environment with high contract enforceability, interest groups lobby politicians more intensively than under SNTV. In particular, we have demonstrated that centralized groups have increased their contacts significantly than decentralized groups. Table 1 ), but they also shape policy-making environment (i.e., centralized vs. decentralized-horizontal axis in Table 1 ) which substantially affect contract enforceability between legislators and organized interests and hence their lobbying intensity and venue choices.
The above finding has an important policy implication for reforming electoral and campaign finance systems. Because voting, candidate endorsement, and campaign donations are the three major instruments of contract enforcement for interest groups, electoral reforms should be implemented with campaign finance reform-e.g., when the electoral system is decentralized, interest groups should be able to use "localized" punishment mechanism which allows them to grant or withdraw campaign finance to individual politicians as opposed to parties.
In concluding, we suggest a few promising directions for future research. First, an apparent extension of this study is to investigate how organizational structures of political parties interact with various structures of interest groups to shape their lobbying strategies. Second, it will be fruitful to think how our findings on lobbying speak to the literature on centralized vs.
decentralized corruption and its relative efficiency. Ackerman (1999: Chap.7) and Kang (2002) have both suggested that centralization of policy-making process can deter "inefficient"
corruption. This debate has spurred questions about whether fiscal and political decentralization leads to good governance and accountability (Treisman 1999). Our findings suggest the opposite that decentralization deters "inefficient" lobbying. How electoral systems and political or fiscal decentralization interact to shape representation of organized interests and the levels of their political activities, including corruption, would thus be a promising line of research. Relatedly, third, it will be fruitful to investigate how the choices of lobbying strategies are related to the success of lobbying. Finally, general welfare and distributional implication of different lobbying strategies under various electoral systems need to be discussed. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% No_tokyo_hq is dropped from the model (1) due to collinearity. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
------------+-------------------------------------------------------
------------+--------------------------------------------------------
No_tokyo_hq is dropped from the model (1) due to collinearity. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Ln_Y=Ln (Y/(1-Y)) when 0<Y<1. Ln_Y=Ln(0.00001/(1-0.00001)) when Y=0; Ln_Y=Ln(0.99999/(1-0.99999)) when Y=1.
